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CASES NOTED
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH
JURY VERDICTS
A judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs in a negligence action.
The defendant moved for a new trial, presenting the signed statements of
the jury foreman and three other jurors (out of six) indicating that their
verdict was arrived at by means which would make it a quotient verdict.'
The motion for new trial was denied. On appeal to the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held, affirmed: Overruling the defendant's motion
for a new trial based on the allegation that jurors had arrived at an improper quotient verdict did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's
discretion where the evidence was unclear.2 Pix Shoes, Inc. v. Howarth,
201 So.2d 80 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
Although it is clear that the use of a quotient verdict will result in
the setting aside of that verdict, it is less certain how resort to the quotient
method is to be proved. Undoubtedly the most significant (and often the
only) source of evidence whereby the use of a quotient verdict might be
proved is the jurors themselves. However, in most jurisdictions, statements, affidavits or testimony offered by jurors for the purpose of impeaching their own verdict are inadmissible.'
1. At a hearing before the trial judge on the motion, three of the jurors testified: one
testified unequivocably that the verdict was a quotient verdict; the testimony of another
juror was inconclusive; the testimony of the third juror contradicted his previously signed
statement.
2. A quotient verdict is defined as a verdict arrived at by adding together the amounts
the several jurors think should be awarded and dividing the sum thus obtained by the total
number of jurors; where the jurors agree in advance to be bound by the quotient so determined it constitutes misconduct of the jury requiring a new trial. See 66 C.J.S. New Trial
559 (1950).
3. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Fleming v. Knowles, 272 Ala. 271, 130
So.2d 326 (1961) ; Wilson v. Wiggins, 54 Ariz. 240, 94 P.2d 870 (1939) ; Norton v. Hickingbottom, 212 Ark. 581, 206 $.W.2d 777 (1947); Ison v. Stewart, 105 Colo. 55, 94 P.2d 701
(1939); Valentine v. Pollak, 95 Conn. 556, 111 A. 869 (1920) ; Croasdale v. Tantum, 11 Del.
218 (1880); Smoky Mountain Stages v. Wright, 62 Ga. App. 121, 8 S.E.2d 453 (1940) ;Kelley
v. Call, 324 I. App. 143, 57 N.E.2d 501 (1944); Houk v. Allen, 126 Ind. 568, 25 N.E. 897
(1890); Klein v. Medical Bldg. Realty Co., 147 So. 122 (La. App. 1933); State v. Pike,
65 Maine 111 (1876); Brimsfield v. Howeth, 101 Md. 520, 73 A. 289 (1909); Boston &
W.R.R. v. Dana, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 83 (1854); Ballance v. Dunnington, 246 Mich. 36, 224
N.W. 434 (1929); Index Drilling Co. v. Williams, 242 Miss. 775, 137 So.2d 525 (1962);
Chrum v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 242 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1951); Kaltenborn v. Bakerink, 80
Nev. 16, 388 P.2d 572 (1964) ; Clark v. Manchester, 64 N.H. 471, 13 A. 867 (1887) ; Iverson
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941) ; Sena v. Sanders, 54
N.M. 83, 214 P.2d 226 (1950); Davis v. Lorenzo's, Inc., 258 App. Div. 933, 16 N.Y.S.2d 624
(1939); Campbell v. High Point, T. & D.R.R., 201 N.C. 102, 159 S.E. 327 (1931); Stadium
Cab Co. v. Shawd, 36 Ohio Law Rep. 456 (Franklin County Ct. App. 1932); Allen v. City
of Tulsa, 345 P.2d 443 (Okla. 1959) ; Hendricks v. Portland Elec. Power Co., 134 Ore. 366,
289 P. 369 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 134 Ore. 376, 292 P. 1094 (1930) ; Rice v. Bauer, 354
Pa. 544, 59 A.2d 885 (1948) ; Luft v. Lingane, 17 R.I. 420, 22 A. 942 (1891) ; Carpenter v.
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The proposition that no evidence of misconduct was competent that
came from the jurors themselves had its origin in the often quoted language of Lord Mansfield in Vaise v. Delaval.4 Having no sound basis of
policy, 5 it also had no basis of precedent. But with the prestige of the
great Chief Justice behind it, the principle of Vaise v. Delaval soon prevailed in England, and its authority became almost unquestioned in the
United States,6 including Florida.7
The policy most frequently relied on to support the Delaval rule
5
was best expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless
wherein the court stressed the possibility of harassment of jurors and the
inviolability of solemnly made verdicts.'
However, the rule against impeachment of verdict by jurors has been
abrogated by statutes in a number of states. 10 Moreover, in a few jurisdictions, it has been held permissible, without statutory authorization, for a
juror's statements to be received in evidence for the purpose of showing
that a quotient verdict has been rendered."
The present status of Florida law as to the admissibility of jurors'
statements impeaching their verdict as a quotient verdict appears unWilley, 65 Vt. 168, 26 A. 488 (1893) ; Washington Luna Park Co. v. Goodrich, 110 Va. 692, 66
S.E. 977 (1910) ; Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W. Va. 594, 64 S.E.2d 606 (1951); Brophy
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 251 Wis. 558, 30 N.W.2d 76 (1947) ; Pullman Co. v.
Finley, 20 Wyo. 456, 125 P. 380 (1912).
4. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
5. 8 J. WioMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2352 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. Id. at 696.
7. One of the earliest Florida cases to recognize the Delaval rule was Coker v. Hayes, 16
Fla. 368 (1878). The court's opinion indicated an acute understanding of the policy behind
the rule:
It is needless to discuss the reasons for the rule. The oath of a juror is not admissible
to impeach his verdict.
Id. at 395.
8. 238 U.S. 264 (1915). (The court refused to allow jurors to testify that they reached
a quotient verdict.)
9. In the language of the court:
[Liet it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into
court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry
in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding.
Id. at 267.
10. CAL. CODE Civ. P. ANN. § 657(2) (Deering 1959) is typical:
Misconduct of the jury; and whenever .. .the jurors .. .resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the
jurors.
Cf. Monroe v. Lashus, 170 Cal. App. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 13 (1959). See also, IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 10-602(2) (1947); REV. CODES OF MONT. ANN. J 93-5603(2) (1947); N.D. R. Civ. P.
59(b)(2) (1957); TEXAS Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2234 (1964); REV. CODE or WASH. ANN.
§ 4.76.020(2) (1962).
The MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942), would permit jurors' testimony on matters which would serve to vitiate or uphold the verdict, but stops short of permitting testimony on the "mental processes' of the jurors' and the effect on the verdict.
11. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1886); Hukle v. Kimble, 172 Kan.
630, 243 P.2d 225 (1952) ; Scherz v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 151 Neb.
415, 37 N.W.2d 721 (1949); East Tenn. & W.N.C.R.R. v. Winters, 85 Tenn. 240, 1 S.W.
790 (1886).
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dear. In the early case of McMurray v. Basnet,'2 the Supreme Court of
Florida held such affidavits inadmissible. McMurray has never been overruled, nor has it been distinguished in any recent Florida case. The apparent conclusion is that it has been simply abandoned. Perhaps the void
left by the abandonment of McMurray has been filled by subsequent
cases which seem to have made inroads into the Delaval rule.' 8 The case
that has gone the furthest in altering the common law "settled rule" is
Marks v. State Road Department,4 which aligned Florida with those
jurisdictions adhering to the rule' 5 stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in
Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telephone Co.:"8
[A] ffidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in
the jury room which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itand
self ... ; that the verdict was determined by aggregation
7
average or by lot ... or other ... improper manner.'
The rule in Marks has been given lip service in subsequent cases
purporting to apply it, but these cases have almost invariably found some
basis on which to distinguish Marks.'8 If the courts had clearly adhered
to the Delaval rule or clearly rejected it in deference to the Marks rule
.12. 18 Fla. 609 (1882):
This affidavit the court very properly ruled out for the reason that a juror could not
be heard upon what transpired within the jury room, especially to prove any irregularities upon the part of such jury.... The affidavit of a juror is not admissible to
impeach his verdict on a motion for a new trial. Id. at 627.
13. Perhaps the earliest such inroad was Orange Belt Ry. v. Craver, 32 Fla. 28, 13 So.
444 (1893), wherein a juror's testimony was admissible to consider if the verdict had been
arrived at in such a manner as to make it an improper verdict. The court said:
[W]e have ... considered [the evidence admissible] because no objection . . . seems
to have been insisted upon at the time it was offered. The settled rule at the common
law excluded a juror as a witness to impeach his verdict . . . . Id. at 36, 13 So. at
447.
However, as late as 1943, the Fla. Supreme Court strictly applied the Delaval rule in Dempsey-Vanderbilt Hotel v. Huisman, 153 Fla. 800, 15 So.2d 903 (1943).
14. 69 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1954).
15. The rule in the Wright case (which the Iowa Supreme Court would, no doubt, be
happy to learn is now characterized as the "true rule" by the Florida courts, albeit 100 years
late) was stated (though perhaps not so lucidly as in Marks) or alluded to in earlier Florida
cases. cf. Linsley v. State, 88 Fla. 135, 101 So. 273 (1924).
See City of Miami v. Bopp. 117 Fla. 532, 158 So. 89 (1934), wherein a motion for new
trial supported by jurors' affidavits was granted. The Supreme Court indicated that all those
matters lying outside the personal consciousness of the individual juror, i.e. matters which
are "accessible to the testimony of others and subject to contradiction," may be shown by
the affidavits of a juror; however, matters in the personal consciousness of one juror should
not be received to overthrow the verdict.
.16. 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
17. Marks v. State Rd. Dep't, 69 So.2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1954) (emphasis supplied). The
reason for that policy being that:
[To receive the affidavit of a juror as to the independent fact that the verdict was
obtained by lot ... or the like, is to receive his testimony as to a fact, which, if not
true can be readily and certainly disproved by his fellow jurors . . . . Id.
18. Cf. Jackson Grain Co. v. Hoskins, 75 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954) (distinguishing Marks
on the basis that in the latter case the improper procedure was discovered before the jury
was discharged) ; Magid v. Mozo, 135 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) (there should be clear
evidence of improper procedure independent of the affidavits of the jury).
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there would not be so much doubt as to the Florida position. Unfortunately, the courts have consistently avoided the basic issue, that is, the
initial admissibility of the jurors' affidavits, preferring instead to base
their decisions on a variety of specious distinctions." Most frequently,
the courts have fallen back on the almost unassailable conclusion that the
evidence was not "sufficient" to warrant a new trial,"0 as was done in the
principal case."'
This case is a perfect example of the less than perfect approach to
the problem typically taken by the Florida courts. Such a decision does a
disservice by skirting the issue. The policy consideration underlying the
Delaval rule is stated by the court in its opinion. While acknowledging
that there may be cases in which post-trial investigations may be appropriate, the instant case, stated the court, does not warrant such investigation, primarily because:
It is difficult enough, in our modern complex society, to secure
good jurors. It will be even more difficult if jurors are to be subjected to harassment, investigation and interrogation subsequent
to each time they perform their public duty. 2
What seemed to bother the court considerably was the resort to the "reprehensible" and "unethical" practice by attorneys of having investigators
approach and interrogate jurors, after trial, regarding their reasons for
arriving at their verdict. 3 The court indicated that the proper procedure
for an attorney to take would be to seek the consent of the trial court if
"he has reason to believe that ground for . . . challenge may exist."24 If,
however, this is to be the only basis on which jurors' testimony will be
accepted, it is likely that the court has overlooked the great difficulty that
will necessarily be encountered in proving misconduct on the part of the
jurors. How can an attorney show "he has reason to believe that ground
for ... challenge" exists if he may not inquire of the jurors as to what
actually transpired in the jury room? Does this not represent a step
backward from Marks?
Although the court cited the "public policy [which] protects a juror
in the legitimate discharge of his duty, and sanctifies the result obtained
thereby,"2 5 they did clearly indicate that proof of the manner in which a
jury reached its verdict is admissible, and, by implication, affidavits of
jurors may supply that proof. In the principal case however, the court
made a weak distinction, namely, that statements of the jurors were
19. See note 18 supra. See also State v. Smith, 183 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) (state-

ments of jurors were as to matters which "inhered in the verdict.")
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Magid v. Mozo, 135 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
Pix Shoes, Inc. v. Howarth, 201 So.2d 80 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
Marks v. State Rd. Dep't, 69 So.2d 771, 775 (Fla. 1954).
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secured without the formality needed in order to consider them affidavits.26 Unfortunately, in light of that distinction, the court was of the
opinion that the evidence here was not so "clear and convincing.., that
a verdict was in fact arrived at in such fashion as to be a quotient verdict."127 The court stated:

At best, only one live witness was before the trial court who
testified that the verdict was arrived at by means which would
make it a quotient verdict. If this be sufficient to overturn an
adverse verdict, as urged by the appellant, then all a losing defense counsel will need to secure a new28trial is one juror to claim
that the verdict was a quotient verdict.
Indeed, should not the affidavit of any one juror2 9 be a sufficient
"claim" that the verdict was arrived at improperly? As the dissent accurately pointed out, the testimony that the quotient process was used was
uncontradicted, the only disputed element being the presence of a prior
agreement to be bound." °
In the principal case, the court failed to meet the problem head on,
thereby ignoring Wigmore's plea for the unequivocable adoption of the
Wright (Iowa) rule as an alternative to Delaval that: "If there cannot be
any principal in this rule, it should at least possess logic."'" Wigmore dismissed the Delaval rule as follows:
[O]f the usual rule [excluding jurors' testimony upon the
point] it may be said that since a determination by lot can
hardly ever be established by other than jurors' testimony, it
becomes a mere pretense to declare a certain irregularity fatal
and yet to exclude all practical means of proving it . . . 2
Clearly, while it is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand the test of absolute perfection,8 3 the proper rule appears
to be to allow the introduction of the statements of jurors to prove misconduct of the jury in arriving at their verdict, with a limitation on the
26. Pix Shoes, Inc. v. Howarth, 201 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. In all the states that have statutory authorization for the admissibility of jurors'
affidavits as evidence of misconduct of the jury the statutes provide the "affidavit of any one
of the jurors" may be used to prove such misconduct. See statutes cited at note 10 supra.
Cf. Orange Belt Ry. v. Craver, 32 Fla. 28, 13 So. 444 (Fla. 1893) (testimony of one
juror considered) ; City of Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 So. 89 (1934) (two jurors); Malone v. Marks Bros. Paving Co. 168 So.2d 753 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (two jurors).

30. Pix Shoes, Inc. v. Howarth, 201 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (Dissent).
There is, however, some authority in Florida in support of the position that even if the

jurors did not agree in advance to be bound by the quotient, use'of the quotient process may
nevertheless constitute grounds for invalidating the verdict. See Jackson Grain Co. v. Hoskins,
75 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
31. 8 J. WxIoRE, Evmr-icE § 2353, at 699 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
32. Id. § 2354, at 711.
33. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947).
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rule excluding testimony as to the mental processes of the jurors. It is
hoped that the Florida courts will soon resolve the present uncertainty
with a clear and precise pronouncement liberalizing the rules on reception
of jurors' testimony.
ALAN S. BECKER

TORTS -

LIABILITY FOR CONCUSSION DAMAGES

FROM BLASTING
Plaintiffs brought an action to recover for damage to their property
allegedly caused by concussion from defendant's blasting operations.
Count Two of the amended complaint, which sought recovery under a
theory of strict liability, was dismissed. On appeal from final judgment
for the defendant, the Second District Court of Appeal, held, reversed and
remanded: "[O]ne lawfully engaged in blasting is liable, irrespective of
negligence, for personal injuries or property damage sustained either as
a result of casting material on adjoining land or as a result of concussion."
Morse v. Hendry Corp., 200 So.2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
It is almost unanimously held that one who by exploding dynamite
causes rocks to be thrown upon neighboring land is absolutely liable on
the basis of trespass to land.' However, where the damage is caused, not
by flying debris, but by concussion of the atmosphere or vibration of
the earth, there is a split of authority. The instant case, one of first impression in Florida as to the issue of liability for concussion damage,2
places Florida among the solid majority of jurisdictions holding the defendant strictly liable.3
Two arguments have been advanced to support the minority position
that there be a showing of negligence. The first is that no cause of action
may be recognized by the courts unless it is one for which some form of
action was available at the common law. 4 At the common law, the only
two forms of action that would have been available for recovery for
damage to real property caused by blasting were trespass and trespass on
the case. 5 However, concussion was not considered to be a physical invasion of the real property.6 Rather, damage caused by such incursions
1. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 14.6 at 813 (1956).

2. The court had another issue to consider. Count one of the amended complaint,
seeking recovery on a third-party beneficiary theory, was also dismissed by the trial court.
That dismissal was likewise reversed.
3. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject see Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951).
4. See J. SMITH, LIABILITY FOR SUBSTANTIAL PHYsIcAL DAMAGE TO LAND BY BLASTING.
THE RULE OF THE FUTURE. 33 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1920).
5. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 7 at 28 (3d ed. 1964).

6. J. SMITH, supra note 4.

